The fall of Malacca
This short note by R.J. Wilkinson, C.M.G., published in the Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (Vol. 13, No. 2, 1935), revisits the Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511 and critically assesses the traditional accounts of the city’s size and military strength.
Summary
Wilkinson briefly recounts the two key events: Diogo Lopez de Sequeira’s failed 1509 visit and Albuquerque’s successful 1511 attack, then turns to questioning the Portuguese claims of a town of 100,000 inhabitants defended by 30,000 warriors and thousands of guns (p. 68). He argues these figures are implausible on several grounds: the Malay Annals state the Malays were unacquainted with artillery; the Portuguese suffered most from poisoned darts rather than firearms; no important Malay leader was slain; and the army was composed of a small palace guard, lesser retainers, and a demoralised conscript levy (pp. 68–69). On population, he notes Malacca had no rice-growing hinterland to sustain such numbers and that the Annals themselves portray a smaller place (p. 69).
Wilkinson concludes by assessing the value of the Malay Annals as a source: anecdotal, undated, and uncritical, yet the best available record of the Sultanate’s character and governmental culture, with the Chinese Annals useful only for dating and the Portuguese and Dutch writers limited by their commercial preoccupations (p. 69).