Shariaization of Malay-Muslim identity in contemporary Malaysia

Abstract

Malay-Muslim identity has been pivotal to the functioning of the modern nation-state that attained independence from Britain on 31 August 1957 as the Federation of Malaya and became Malaysia on 16 September 1963 with the incorporation of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into the federation. Malay-Muslims constitute the majority of Malaysia’s population, albeit not by an overwhelming percentage, and the definitive features, structures and conventions of the Malaysian state give them control of the major levers of power. Malay-Muslim identity is grounded in the Federal Constitution, but has undergone metamorphoses as a result of shifting boundaries in the conceptualization and praxis of Islam among Malay-Muslims. This article discusses some of the causes and ramifications of the contemporary essentialization of Islamic thought and practice in Malaysia. I argue that a sharia-centric Islamist bias, paradoxically, came close to uniting hitherto opposing sides of the Malay-Muslim religio-political divide during Najib Razak’s administration (2009–18).

Summary

This article traces the progressive “shariaization” of Malay-Muslim identity in Malaysia — the institutionalization of sharia-based values, norms, and categories into the discourse and practice of Malay religio-cultural life (p. 51). Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid argues that while the Federal Constitution of 1957 deliberately confined sharia courts to state-level jurisdiction with strict limits on their punitive powers (the “3-6-5 safeguards” capping sentences at three years, six canings, and RM5,000 in fines), successive political pressures from the 1980s Islamic resurgence onward steadily eroded these boundaries (pp. 52–54). The pivotal moment came with PAS’s 1990 takeover of Kelantan, which provoked UMNO into a competitive Islamization drive that expanded sharia criminal offences enactments, elevated the sharia court hierarchy, and centralized Islamic administration under the federal government through JAKIM (pp. 55–56).

The author demonstrates that this process was driven less by theological conviction than by electoral competition between UMNO and PAS, each seeking to outdo the other in claiming custodianship of Islam as the Federation’s official religion (p. 56). Under Najib Razak (2009–18), the two parties converged on the question of hudud, with UMNO’s tacit support for PAS’s Sharia Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Bill 355 (RUU355) representing a near-fusion of hitherto opposing sides of the Malay-Muslim religio-political divide (pp. 57–59). The shariaization of identity is further evidenced by the National Transformation 2050 blueprint, whose ideal Malay-Muslim citizen “Firdaus Imtiaz” is depicted as a Quran-memorizing, sharia-qualified, Malay-heritage cosmopolitan — a figure conspicuously absent of any non-Muslim engagement (pp. 61–62).

The cumulative effect, the author contends, has been a narrowing of Malayness from a historically syncretic and plural identity to one defined almost exclusively by a legalistic, state-enforced Islam, with serious consequences for inter-religious relations, intra-Muslim pluralism, and national integration (pp. 63–69).

Key Findings

• In a December 2005 Merdeka Centre survey of over 1,000 Muslims, 72.7% identified “Muslim” as their primary identity, far exceeding “Malaysian” (14.4%) and “Malay” (12.5%); 57.3% supported hudud, though 63.3% agreed sharia should remain within constitutional limits (p. 63).
• A 2015 Merdeka Centre poll found 60% of Malays prioritized Muslim identity over Malaysian (27%) and Malay (6%) identities, while Malaysian Chinese and Indian respondents overwhelmingly favoured national identity (58% and 63% respectively) over religious identity (3% and 16%) (p. 63).
• The 1988 amendment to Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution barred federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters within sharia courts’ purview, effectively placing sharia judges on par with civil judges and enabling civil courts to abdicate responsibility in conversion and custody disputes (p. 54).
• Pew Research Center data (2008–2012) showed Malaysians significantly outnumbered Indonesian and Thai Muslims in favouring sharia as the law of the land and corporal punishments including stoning for adultery and death for apostasy (p. 63).
• The CIMB Foundation survey (2016, n=1,504) confirmed that while all religious groups showed in-group favourability, Muslims displayed the most acute tendency toward exclusive religious worldviews and growing social distance from non-Muslims, with Malays and non-Malays failing to share a common conception of what it means to be Malaysian (p. 64).
• The 2015 sharia index, developed by JAKIM, IIUM, and YADIM, purported to measure Malaysia’s compliance with maqasid sharia across education, economy, politics, health, law, infrastructure, environment, and culture — a metric with no constitutional basis (p. 59).

Conclusion

Abdul Hamid concludes that shariaization has come at a heavy price: the rise of Muslim sectarianism pitting conservative and liberal groups against one another, the marginalization of non-Muslims and non-Malay Bumiputeras, and the renunciation of a proud Muslim tradition of inter- and intra-faith pluralism (p. 69). As the nation-state makes the Malays rather than the other way round, the scope of Malayness inevitably grows narrower, and terms like “liberalism” and “pluralism” have become stigmatized in Malay-Muslim parlance (p. 69).

Context

• The article was originally presented at the 17th Annual International Conference of Islamic Studies (AICIS) in Indonesia in November 2017, sponsored by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs (p. 49, n. 2).
• The author, a Professor of Political Science at Universiti Sains Malaysia, notes he has personally experienced the consequences of questioning sharia court empowerment, being targeted for suggesting Muslims be given the choice between secular and Islamic criminal law (p. 68).

References