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Post-war constitutional changes in Brunei 1944―1948

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Post-war constitutional changes in Brunei 1944―1948

A.V.M. Horton’s 1990 article in the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society examines how the British colonial administration engineered the transfer of Brunei’s High Commissionership from the Governor-General to the Governor of Sarawak between 1944 and 1948. Drawing on Colonial Office and War Office files at the Public Record Office, Kew, Horton argues that the British skillfully manipulated Brunei’s leaders into accepting administrative subordination to Sarawak while deliberately avoiding any formal treaty amendment that might provoke opposition, leaving the Brunei people with virtually no say in their own constitutional future.

Summary

In January 1944, a joint Colonial Office and War Office memorandum recommended that the pre-war constitutional arrangements in north-west Borneo should not be restored after the Japanese defeat. The approved directive called for the cession to the British monarch of full jurisdiction in Brunei and Sarawak, enabling legislation under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, and envisaged a new Governor-General at Singapore to coordinate policy across Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo territories (p. 39–42). A draft treaty granting the British Crown “full power and jurisdiction within the State of Brunei” was even prepared, most probably in mid-1945 (p. 42, 52). In practice, however, these ambitious plans were never executed. The rising tide of protest against the MacMichael treaties in Malaya and the cession of Sarawak to the Crown in 1946 advised caution, and the Colonial Office concluded in May 1947 that it “would be unwise to propose any changes in the agreement of 1905–1906 beyond those required to bring it into line with what is now planned for the Protected States in Malaya” (p. 46).

Instead, Governor-General Malcolm MacDonald proposed a five-point administrative scheme in which the Governor of Sarawak would assume the duties of High Commissioner for Brunei, heads of Sarawak technical departments would advise the Sultan, and additional junior administrators would be seconded to the Sultanate (p. 46). The Secretary of State, A. Creech Jones, advised that the changes be described as “purely administrative” and that the Governor-General should stress the Resident’s position remained unchanged, thereby avoiding any impression that Brunei was becoming a division of Sarawak (p. 46–47). MacDonald visited Brunei in late November 1947 and reported that the Sultan “agreed to the proposals without exception” and that the State Council subsequently approved them unanimously (p. 48).

The public announcement in March 1948 was met with initial suspicion, which Resident L.H.N. Davis dispelled through a tour of five main centres, emphasifying emphatically that the change did not involve political or financial subjection to Sarawak, the application of Sarawak laws, or the posting of Sarawak Native Officers (p. 49–50). Davis noted that had the change involved any closer association with Sarawak, “there would have been very real, though passive, opposition” rooted in historic distrust and deep-rooted conservatism (p. 50). The transfer ceremony took place on 1 May 1948, and the new High Commissioner, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, reported it was “received with genuine good will” (p. 50).

Key Findings

  • The 1944 Cabinet directive explicitly recommended cession of full jurisdiction in Brunei to the British Crown, and a draft treaty to this effect was prepared by mid-1945, but the plan was abandoned in favour of a less confrontational administrative arrangement (pp. 39–42, 52).
  • The Colonial Office deliberately chose not to raise the question of British Crown jurisdiction with the Sultan, reasoning that “we can achieve in practice all we desire under the terms of the existing Treaty” and that raising it might “arouse an opposition party in Brunei” (p. 46).
  • The Governor-General’s November 1947 visit secured the Sultan’s unqualified agreement and unanimous State Council approval, though the Colonial Office had earlier advised that the Sultan should be informed “as a matter of courtesy” but not made “the subject of negotiations” (pp. 46, 48).
  • Rumours that the Governor of Sarawak was to be appointed Governor of Brunei circulated in January 1948, suspected to have leaked from the State Council or the Sultan’s secretary, raising doubts about whether Brunei Malays were as favourable as the Governor-General supposed (p. 49).
  • The only sign of opposition at the public announcement came from “isolated members of now dormant youth association, notably school teachers” who characterised the announcement as a fait accompli and undemocratic, but they had “negligible following” (p. 50).
  • The 1948 arrangement was explicitly framed as a stepping stone toward the longer-term Colonial Office policy of creating a Federation of “Malaysia,” though Brunei ultimately retained its separate status and did not join the Federation in 1963 (p. 51).

Conclusion

Horton’s definitive takeaway is that the 1948 constitutional change was a product of British manipulation rather than Bruneian agency: “the Brunei people had virtually no say in their own destiny,” and the papers “demonstrate the skill with which the British persuaded — not to say manipulated — leaders of Brunei to accept their proposed course of action” (p. 51). The Sarawak line was never popular in Brunei and was abrogated at the earliest opportunity in 1959, when the Residential Era ended and the Sultanate achieved internal autonomy.

Context

  • The article draws primarily on Colonial Office files (CO 537/2244, CO 825/42, CO 825/43, CO 943/1) and War Office files (WO 203/4471A, WO 203/5535) held at the Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey.
  • Horton’s research was financed by the British SSRC (later ESRC) and supervised by the late D.K. Bassett, a leading scholar of Bornean history.

References